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Bank work experience versus political connections:
Which matters for bank loan financing?

Abstract
This paper examines how bank lending decisions are affected either by executives’
connections with banks, through their former banking experience, or by their political
connections with governments, using a sample of bank loans granted to Chinese listed nonSOEs from 2003 to 2010. We find that bank loans are more closely related to profitability for
firms with bank connections, while firms’ political connections weaken this relationship. We
further find that the influence of bank connections is more significant for firms from less
supported industries or less developed regions. Furthermore, firms with bank connections are
less likely to become financially distressed after the initiation of their bank loans and
experience higher future stock returns, while firms with political connections experience the
opposite outcome. Overall, our results indicate that in the context of a relationship-based
economy like China, firms’ connections with banks create value by alleviating information
asymmetry and improving banks’ lending decisions, while political connections result in
capital misallocation and subsequent deterioration in performance.
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1. Introduction
Recent literature has documented that the bank-firm relationship is valuable for firms’
bank loan financing. One strand of literature emphasizes the importance of social connections
between bank executives and borrowers, since this social connection enables banks to
catalyse the borrowers’ proprietary and specific information and reduce banks’ monitoring
costs (Engelberg et al., 2012; Haselmann et al., 2013). Another strand of literature, with
respect to relationship banking/lending, suggests that banks may invest in costly information
production by building a close relationship over time with borrowers (Boot and Thakor,
1994). Relationship lending allows banks to learn about borrowers more easily at a lower
cost. However, there is mixed evidence regarding whether relationship lending is beneficial
for borrowers. Some studies argue that relationship lending can reduce banks’ monitoring
costs and benefit borrowers with lower financing costs (Boot, 2000; Behr et al., 2011;
Bharath et al., 2011), while other studies propose the alternative view that relationship
lending can lead to firms being locked in, and that banks may seek more rents due to
monopoly power through increasing financing costs (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Kano et al.,
2011).
In a departure from previous studies, but complementary to them, our focus is to explore
another channel through which the bank-firm relationship is built, namely the bank work
experience of firms’ executives. Through this work experience, executives have built up their
personal relationship with bank managers in that bank and may even extend their
relationships to those in other banks. Recent evidence has suggested that firms’ connections
with banks, accumulated through firm executives’ banking experience, are valuable for firms
in terms of applying sophisticated financial policies (Custodio and Metzger, 2014) and better
acquisition decisions (Huang et al., 2014). However, these studies almost exclusively focus
on developed markets and little is known about the financial implications of the bank-firm
relationship in China, whose economy is known to be relationship-based.
Meanwhile, it has also been widely documented that political connections based on
executives’ close connections with governments bring various benefits to firms in accessing
financial resources, such as bank loans and equity issuing, through rent seeking from
government regulations or government lobbying (Cull and Xu, 205; Claessens et al., 2008;
Faccio, 2010; Li et al., 2008; Houston et al., 2014).
Overall, there is a clear connection between the influence of political connections and the
bank-firm relationship (we use the term “bank connections” hereafter) on bank lending. Thus,
we are interested in investigating the relative impacts of bank connections and political
2

connections on conferring access to bank loans and explaining how banks make lending
decisions. In particular, this paper intends to answer the question “whether and how do bank
and political connections affect banks’ lending decisions?” The answer to this question is an
essential element in gauging firm value and financial implications in a relationship-based
economy, and may present a complementary perspective to existing literature. Following
existing studies, we use the sensitivity of the amount of bank loans to firm profitability as the
proxy for bank lending decision. This is because banks have strong incentives to allocate
more capital to financially healthy firms, thus reflected by a strong sensitivity of bank loan
size to firm profitability (Zheng and Zhu, 2013).
This paper conducts the research using non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) in
China, because the non-SOE sector in China has provided an ideal institutional environment
in which to address these issues for several reasons, as explained below.
First, China’s financial system and banking industry are largely controlled by the state,
and bank loans are more likely to flow to SOEs than non-SOEs. As a result, non-SOEs face
many obstacles in trying to access external finance in order to survive (Firth et al., 2009).
Using China’s non-SOEs as the sample can avoid the diluted effect of state ownership in
SOEs, and allow us to identify the causal effects of both kinds of connection on firms’
financial policies and banks' lending decisions.
Moreover, there are cross-sectional variations in government supporting policies across
industries, as every five years the government announces a “Five Year Plan” specifying that
particular industries will be supported by government policies. There are also cross-sectional
variations in institutional environments across provinces in China (Fan et al., 2011). Thus the
Chinese setting provides a good environment and creates cross-sectional variations which
may shape the effects of bank connections and political connections on banking finance and
banks’ lending decisions. Such a cross-regional approach within one country makes it
possible to control for the role of accounting rules, culture and other country-level variables
(Li et al., 2009). Therefore, an in-depth case study of a particular country’s experience can
provide a useful complement to cross-country regressions. For all these reasons, our sample
facilitates this research into exploring the financial implications of bank connections and
political connections with respect to firms’ banking finance and banks’ lending decisions.
We conduct analyses at the bank loan level because there are problems of identification
with firm-level data, since the results could be due to unobserved heterogeneities in firms
which are correlated with bank lending decisions and connections. Our results show that
firms with either bank connections or political connections have access to more bank loans.
3

We also find that bank connections can enhance banks’ lending decisions by strengthening
the positive relationship between bank loan size and firm profitability, while political
connections weaken this relationship. Our empirical results further show that the effect of
bank connections is more significant for firms from less supported industries or less
developed regions. By focusing on subsequent performance, we find that firms with bank
connections perform better over three-year periods after the initiation of their bank loans,
while those with political connections perform worse. Additionally, we find that both firm
and bank shareholders highly value bank loans to firms with bank connections, as reflected
by higher abnormal returns around bank loan announcements, and discount the value of bank
loans to firms with political connections. Our main findings are robust to corrections for
alternative measurements of connections and an alternative sample. Even though the
endogeneity issue is less likely to be ruled out completely, we have conducted further tests to
mitigate the endogeneity issue and confirm the robustness of our main results, including
using the Heckman two stage and propensity score matching methods. These findings suggest
that bank connections reinforce the use of profitability in allocating capital and create value
for firms, while political connections are more likely to result in capital misallocation, which
may reduce firm value.
Our study is related to several strands of a growing body of literature. First, we
contribute to literature on the implications of managerial networks for corporate financial
decisions. Previous studies have examined the effects of bank connections and political
connections on firms’ bank financing separately, and there is no evidence to compare the
relative impact of bank connections and political connections. This study fills this gap. In
particular, while we have confirmed the existing findings that political connections lead to
more bank loans, our findings indicate that political connections distort capital allocation and
cause subsequent underperformance after bank loans have been granted. We argue that
connections with banks, a more direct and specific measurement for bank-firm relationships
than executives’ political connections, more effectively influence Chinese non-SOEs' success
in obtaining bank loans, and further improve banks’ lending decisions.
Secondly, our study adds to the evolving literature on agency problems and information
asymmetry. We provide evidence from an emerging market that connections between firms
and banks encourage the transfer of information between them, which results in optimal
lending contracts, due to either better information flow or more efficient monitoring.
Furthermore, our study also advances the view that the financial work experience of
executives/directors matters for firm value and policies (Custodio and Metzger, 2014; Huang
4

et al., 2014), and we provide strong evidence that banking experience matters for firms’
financial policies and the enhancement of firm value.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the institutional
background and develops the hypotheses; Section 3 describes the data and methodology;
Sections 4 and 5 discuss the empirical results; and Section 6 concludes.

2. Institutional background and development of hypotheses
In this section we describe the institutional background in China related to our study, and
develop corresponding hypotheses based on existing theories and China’s institutional
system.
2.1 Banking industry and banks' lending decisions
In the late 1970s the Chinese government launched a significant reform of the banking
industry by establishing four wholly state-owned banks (the Big Four), which took control of
all the lending functions of the People’s Bank of China (the central bank). In 1994, three new
wholly state-owned policy banks1 were established, and took over policy lending from the
Big Four banks. In 1996, joint-stock commercial banks and city banks began to emerge.
Though more types of banks were starting to emerge locally, the state-owned banks were not
greatly concerned about the competition, due to the dominance of state ownership and the
size of their own assets. In 2006, the Chinese government launched banking reforms for these
state-owned banks in light of the international competition mandated by the World Trade
Organization (WTO). The reforms were introduced on several fronts, including transferring
non-performing loans to newly established asset-management companies, introducing
strategic investors and public listing. All of these reforms aimed to transform the banks into
business entities operating on a commercial basis, which has naturally affected the behaviour
of bank executives and lending decisions.
Originally, bank loans mainly took the form of credit loans granted to SOEs at low
interest rates and without any guarantees or collateral, in conformance with lending policy.
These loans were one of the causes of a higher ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs). As this
market-oriented economic reform deepened, banks became more aware of loan risks, and
from the 1990s they increasingly demanded guarantees or collateral. According to a survey of
13 domestic banks between 2000 and 2005, the average collateral requirement for secured
loans increased from 22% to 32% of all loans granted (Yang and Qian, 2008), of which land
1

These are the State Development Bank, the Agricultural Development Bank of China and the Export and
Import Bank of China.
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or buildings became the most acceptable form. Banks also demanded the equivalent value of
fixed assets as collateral before granting loans, especially to privately controlled firms
(Yeung, 2009).
In addition, SOEs were favoured over non-SOEs in granting these bank loans (Wei and
Wang, 1997; Cull and Xu, 2003), with state-owned banks often lending to SOEs for political,
employment and taxation purposes rather than just profitability. As discussed by Yeung
(2009), for these banks (the Big Four SOCBs, policy banks, joint-stock commercial banks
and city banks), the decision to grant loans was often determined by unofficial assessment
criteria. SOEs tended to receive loans without pledging the necessary collateral because of
state ownership and implicit government guarantees, while non-SOEs were expected to
pledge collateral by securing their fixed assets to the equivalent value of the collateral
required. In other words, banks made a rational decision to bias their lending against nonSOEs based on the higher risks and higher transaction and risk-evaluation costs.
2.2 Hypothesis development
The existing literature proposes explanations for the phenomenon observed in China of
significant economic growth in the private sector in the presence of formal financing
discrimination, and suggests that alternative financing channels based on relationships
support the growth of the private sector (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2013). As information
asymmetry and the agency problem are the main obstacles to firms’ financing (Leland and
Pyle, 1977; Sharpe, 1990; Sufi, 2007; Firth et al., 2009), firms have incentives to alleviate
information asymmetry and conflicts of interest with banks by establishing connections with
them.
One way to establish connections is to employ executives with previous work experience
in banks. These executives may use their expertise and networks to facilitate a firm’s access
to external financing through the following ways. First, work experience in the banking
sector allows executives to establish/maintain connections with their former employers or
even wider connections in the banking industry. In this sense, these executives have acquired
the necessary skills to effectively communicate with banks and negotiate loan terms. They
also facilitate firm-specific information that is not publicly available or observable to be
revealed and shared with banks. This will mitigate information asymmetry and reduce banks’
monitoring costs, and lead to more effective monitoring and improved information
transparency. Secondly, through their career paths, these executives bring professional
knowledge (such as financing and investment) and sophisticated financial skills with them
that allow them to adopt other financial decisions to facilitate firms’ access to external
6

financing. Moreover, it is notable that trustworthiness plays a key role in the intensive and
complex process of communications, which is essential for the effective transfer of
borrowers' confidential information. When a connection and trust have been established,
banks have proprietary information on firms, and financial contracting based on relationships
should occur because there is less information asymmetry and conflict of interest between the
parties.
In addition, as argued by Shelifer and Vishny (1997), banks exert effective external
governance in terms of scrutinizing firms’ projects and creditworthiness when making
lending decisions. In this line of research, Firth et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2013) provide
empirical evidence that banks use commercial judgments in allocating credit to private firms
in China. Thus, due to reduced information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between firms
and banks, banks can make more efficient scrutiny of loan applications and better evaluate
firms’ future earnings. Therefore, we expect that banks can make optimal lending decisions
based on the profitability of firms with bank connections.
H1: Firms’ bank connections strengthen the relationship between bank loan size and
firm profitability.
In addition to firms’ bank connections, firms would also like to hire executives/directors
who have work experience in governments to establish close connections with government,
and firms that do so are found to be more leveraged and face a lower cost of debt financing
than their peers (Claessens et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010; Qi et al. 2010; Houston
et al., 2014). This is particularly true for non-SOEs in China, as they are often denied access
to bank loans and are subject to heavy government regulations or “extralegal” fees. In such an
environment, close ties to the government help them overcome these market and state failures
and avoid ideological discrimination (Li et al., 2008). However, compared with the effects of
firms’ bank connections, political connections may have the opposite influence and be valuedestroying. Specifically, government officials exert significant pressure on local state-owned
banks to extend credits and preferential treatment to politically connected firms. In this sense,
banks are reluctant to make these politically based loans; thus political connections do not
necessarily improve the quality of either corporate governance or information transparency in
these politically connected non-SOEs. Though political connections may bring more bank
loans to politically connected firms, these politically based loans are granted for political
rather than economic reasons, regardless of firm profitability, and could cause capital
misallocation (Zheng and Zhu, 2013). As this politically based lending is not aligned with
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banks’ interests, banks are unlikely to exert effective monitoring, which may further weaken
banks’ lending decisions. Therefore, we construct the following hypothesis:
H2: Firms’ political connections weaken the relationship between bank loan size and
firm profitability.
3. Data and variables
3.1 The sample selection
The sample we use to conduct the empirical analysis is collected from the Bank Loan
dataset of the Chinese Stock and Market Accounting Research database (CSMAR) from 2003
to 2010. As new accounting and auditing standards were applied to all listed firms in China in
2002, we start our sample from 2003. This Bank Loan dataset includes the information for
each announcement, such as loan amount, interest rate, loan maturity, lending bank, whether
the loan is guaranteed by a third party and whether the loan is secured by collateral.
To examine the influence of both bank and political connections on the bank lending
decisions, we initially assemble 807 bank loan announcements. We then delete 10 contracts
with missing information on the loan amounts, 25 contracts granted to non-SOEs in the
financial industry and 23 contracts granted to non-SOEs flagged with ST or *ST2, leaving
749 loan contract observations. Then, matching with the data from the sub-database of
balance sheets, cash-flow statements and income statements, we also delete those
observations for which information on the corporate governance and firm characteristics of
these non-SOEs is missing. We are left with 730 loan contract observations where a loan was
granted to our sample firms. To avoid the influence of outliers, we also winsorize the top and
bottom 1% of all continuous variables.
According to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), Chinese listed firms
are required to disclose those bank loans whose transaction is more than 10% of equity book
value and those that are more than 10 million RMB. Therefore, a sample of bank loans we
collect includes both large bank loans which are disclosed compulsorily and small loans
which are disclosed voluntarily. These bank loans were granted to 185 listed non-SOEs and
account for 16.78% of all 1102 listed non-SOEs by the end of 2010. A question which then
naturally arises is to what extent this sample is representative of the population of all nonSOEs. To demonstrate the representativeness of our sample, we follow Huang et al. (2012)
by comparing certain characteristics between our sample and all listed non-SOEs (Table 1).
2

ST stands for Special Treatment and refers to listed firms that have already had negative net profits for two
consecutive years. *ST refers to listed firms that already had negative net profits for three consecutive years and
thus have the probability of being delisted from the stock exchanges.
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With regard to profitability, the average return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) for
our sample are 3.77% and 8.46%, respectively, which are quite comparable to 3.51% and
8.76% for all listed non-SOEs; the differences are insignificant. Leverage for our sample
firms is 50.48%, which is quite close to the level for all listed non-SOEs (49.48%). We also
observe that both employee number and largest shareholding do not significantly differ
between our sample firms and all listed non-SOEs. Overall, our sample characteristics are not
significantly different from the population of non-SOEs in terms of profitability, leverage,
firm size or ownership structure.
Table 1. Comparison of firm characteristics between non-SOEs in our sample and all listed non-SOEs
Our sample non-SOEs
All listed non-SOEs
Difference test (t-value)
Return on assets (ROA)
3.77%
3.51%
0.26%(0.98)
Return on sales (ROS)
8.46%
8.76%
-0.30%(-0.47)
Leverage
50.48%
49.48%
1.00%(0.17)
Employee number
1516.0
2086.7
-570.7(-1.33)
Largest shareholding
33.32%
35.22%
-1.90%(-1.25)
Observations
730
1,102

3.2 Measuring bank connections and political connections
We manually collect information on the career paths and work experience of executives
and directors (including CEO, Chairman and other executive directors) for each firm each
year by searching press and online news resources, and combine this information with brief
résumés provided by the CSMAR database. We consider a firm to have a bank connection if
at least one executive has work experience in either commercial banks or investment banks.
To make sure that bank-connected individuals influence corporate strategy effectively, we
carefully identify their work positions and only consider governors, vice-governors, managers
and vice-managers of banks or departments of banks. In our definition we consider all banks
at different levels, such as headquarters, branches and sub-branches. In our sample, all
executives with banking experience are former bankers and we find none of them are
currently holding a senior position in any bank. In this sense, our bank connections can rule
out a complicated situation of conflicts of interest that arise when a current banker is sitting
on a firm’s board.
In the spirit of Fan et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2011a), we consider a firm to have a
political connection if at least one executive is any of the following, formerly or currently: (1)
government official; (2) military official; (3) member of the standing committee of the
National People’s Congress (NPC); or (4) member of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC).
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Empirically, we create a dummy variable, Bank, which equals 1 if a firm has bank
connections and 0 otherwise. We also create a dummy variable, Political, which equals 1 if a
firm has political connections and 0 otherwise. In the empirical analysis, while we almost
exclusively rely on these dummy variables capturing the presence of either bank-connected or
politically connected executives, we also conduct robustness tests using the proportion of
bank-connected or politically connected executives/directors3. All variables, including those
of key interest and control variables, are defined in Table 2.
Table 2. Variables and definitions
Name of Variable
Loansize
Bank connections (Bank)

Political connections (Political)

Return on assets (ROA)
Firm_age (Firm age)
Firm size (Size)
Leverage
Tangibility (Tangible)
Cash-flow volatility (Volatility)
Employee
Independent director (Indep)
Duality
Bigfour
Repeat
Executive age (Exeage)

Executive tenure (Tenure)

Executive education (Education)

Bank ROA (BankROA)
Bank board size (Bankboard)

Definition of variable
Log of the amount of bank loans.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if an executive/director (including the
chairman of the board, CEO and other directors) was a former officer
of a bank, and 0 otherwise.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if an executive/director (including the
chairman of the board, CEO and other directors) was any of the
following formerly or currently: (1) government official; (2) military
official; (3) member of the standing committee of the National
People’s Congress (NPC); (4) member of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); (5) member of All-China
Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC). The variable is equal
to 0 otherwise.
Net income / Total assets.
Natural log of years since the firm was established.
Natural log of firm total assets.
Total debts / Total assets.
Tangible assets / Total assets.
The volatility of cash flows for the previous three years.
Natural log of number of employees.
Ratio of independent directors to total directors.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman and 0
otherwise.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the lending bank is one of the Big
Four and 0 for other banks.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is a repeat borrowing
obtained from a specific bank and 0 for the first borrowing.
The age of the connected executives. If the firm is neither bankconnected nor politically connected, this value is defined as the age of
the chairman.
The number of years that the connected executives have held their
positions in the firms. If the firm is neither bank-connected nor
politically connected, this value is defined as the tenure of the
chairman.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the connected executive has a degree
of master or above and 0 otherwise. If the firm is neither bankconnected nor politically connected, this value is defined as the
education level of the chairman.
ROA of lending banks.
Log of number of directors on boards of lending banks.

3

According to Chen et al. (2011a), the effectiveness of independent directors in influencing corporate policy is
debatable because they are not appointed voluntarily by firms but required to be on the board in accordance with
the CSRC rule. Thus, we do not consider independent directors in our main empirical analysis.
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3.3 Models and estimation
We perform empirical analysis to test our hypotheses H1 and H2 by examining the
effects of both types of connection on the relationship between bank loan size and firm
profitability. In the spirit of the equations used by existing studies (Firth et al., 2009; Chen et
al., 2013; Zheng and Zhu, 2013), we develop the following equation regarding the
determinants of bank loan size, and include proxies for both types of connection as
independent variables. Then, following the discussion that bank loans granted should depend
on the borrowing firm’s profitability (Firth et al., 2009; Zheng and Zhu, 2013), we use the
sensitivity of newly granted bank loans to firms’ profitability as the proxy for the bank’s
lending decision, where strong sensitivity indicates an optimal lending decision. The baseline
model is expressed as follows:

Loansizeit   0  1Connection it   2 Connection it * ROAit   3 ROAit
  4 Firmageit   5 Sizeit   6 Leverageit   7Tangibleit
  8Volatility it   9 Employee it  10 Indep it  11Duality it

(1)

 12 Bigfourit  13Repeat it  14 Exeage it  15Tenureit
 16 Education it  17 BankROAit  18 Bankboardit   it
where Loansize is the bank loan size, defined as the log of the amount of the newly granted
bank loans. Connection is the indicator of our key variables, including Bank and Political.
ROA is return on assets, the proxy for firm profitability, calculated as the ratio of net income
to total assets, and we include one interaction term between Connection and ROA to test the
effect of previous work experience on banks' lending decisions. In this equation, we also
control for other variables of firm, executive and bank characteristics which are defined in
Table 2. We also include industry and year fixed effects in the regression estimation.
In the empirical analysis, we first separately enter the bank connection dummy and
political connection dummy to examine their individual effect. We then put them together to
test our main hypotheses, comparing their individual effects and examining which effect is
more significant.
4. Empirical results
4.1 Summary statistics
Table 3 provides the summary statistics for the study sample period from 2003 to 2010,
including all variables used for the univariate and multivariate tests. The summary shows that
for all bank loan announcements we collected, the average log of bank loan amount is 17.48.
With regard to both bank connections and political connections, we find that 17.26% of total
observations have bank connections, and 40.41% have political connections. These indicate
11

that among the 730 observations in our sample, there are 126 (=730*17.26%) observations of
firms which have bank connections and 295 (=730*40.41%) observations of firms which
have political connections. Moreover, in our sample, we also find that there are 29
observations of firms which have both bank connections and political connections. We also
conduct the correlations between each pair of independent variables to make sure that none of
them are highly correlated with each other. From the unreported correlation matrix, the
correlation coefficients are all less than 0.25, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a
problem in the regression analysis.
Table 3. Summary statistics for all variables
Mean
Loansize
17.48
Bank connections (Bank)
17.26%
Political connections (Political)
40.41%
Return on assets (ROA)
3.77%
Firm_age (Firmage)
1.72
Firm size (Size)
21.43
Leverage
50.48%
Tangible
47.05%
Cash-flow volatility (Volatility)
1.78
Employee
6.30
Independent director (Indep)
25.47%
Duality
12.19%
Bigfour
43.49%
Repeat
68.09%
Exeage
43.92
Tenure
2.26
Education
53.6%
BankROA
1.08%
Bankboard
2.56
All variables are defined in Table 2.

Median
17.50
0
0
2.96%
2.07
21.11
51.95%
41.04%
1.79
6.49
33.33%
0
0
1
44
1.87
1
0.97%
2.64

Bottom
quartile
16.52
0
0
1.01%
1.09
20.74
41.68%
29.55%
1.72
4.85
10.00%
0
0
0
40
1.67
0
0.32%
2.39

Upper quartile

Observations

18.42
0
1
5.32%
2.30
22.21
66.52%
65.31%
1.80
7.52
36.36%
0
1
1
51
3
1
1.75%
2.70

730
730
730
730
730
730
730
730
730
730
730
730
730
730
730
730
730
730
730

Table 4 summarizes the distributions of the total 730 bank loans included in our sample
according to year, industry, the number of banks that granted loans and number of non-SOEs
that received the loans, and these distributions are reported in three panels separately. Panel A
shows that more than 50% of total loans were granted after 2007, Panel B shows that most of
the loans were granted to the firms from the manufacturing industry and Panel C shows that a
majority of loans were granted by the Big Four banks. Panel D shows that more than 50% of
banks granted only one bank loan during our sample and most of the firms in our sample
have received less than five bank loans.
Table 4. Distributions of bank loans by year, industry, bank types and number of banks and number of
non-SOEs
Number of bank loans
% of the total sample
Panel A: Distribution of bank loans by year
2003
90
12.33
2004
52
7.12
2005
26
3.56
2006
34
4.66
12

2007
116
15.89
2008
164
22.47
2009
160
21.92
2010
88
12.05
Total
730
100
Panel B: Distribution of bank loans by industry sector
Agriculture and fishery
13
1.78
Mining
23
3.15
Manufacturing
499
68.36
Public Utility
15
2.05
Construction
11
1.51
Wholesale and retail
12
1.64
Transportation
47
6.44
Hotel and catering industry
38
5.21
Technology services
12
1.64
Real estate
13
1.78
Social services
47
6.44
Total
730
100
Panel C: Distribution of bank loans by bank types
Shenzhen Development Bank
10
1.37
Three policy banks
12
1.64
Huaxia Bank
15
2.05
China Guangfa Bank
20
2.74
China Everbright Bank
22
3.01
Industrial Bank
27
3.70
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank
34
4.66
China Merchants Bank
35
4.79
China Minsheng Bank
41
5.62
China CITIC Bank
49
6.71
Bank of Communications
57
7.81
China Construction Bank
58
7.95
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
67
9.18
Agricultural Bank of China
75
10.27
Bank of China
90
12.33
Other banks and financial institutions
118
16.16
Total
730
100
Panel D: Breakdown of number of bank loans by the number of banks granting the loans and number of nonSOEs receiving the loans
Number of bank loans
Number of banks granting loans
% of total banks
1
34
51.52
2
8
12.12
3
2
3.03
4
2
3.03
5
2
3.03
7
1
1.52
10
2
3.03
12
1
1.52
15
1
1.52
20
1
1.52
22
1
1.52
27
2
3.03
>34
9
13.64
Total
66
100
Number of bank loans
Number of non-SOEs receiving loans
% of total non-SOEs
1
85
45.95
2
29
15.68
3
19
10.27
4
11
5.95
5
15
8.11
6
5
2.80
13

8
3
1.62
9
1
0.54
10
3
1.62
11
2
1.08
12
3
1.62
>13
9
4.86
Total
185
100
This table presents information on the distributions of bank loans in our sample from 2003 to 2010. Panels A to
C present the distributions of bank loans according to year, industry and bank types. Panel D presents
information on the distributions of bank loans according to the number of banks that have granted loans and
number of non-SOEs that have received bank loans in our sample from 2003 to 2010.

To provide some preliminary evidence for our hypotheses, Table 5 presents the
univariate tests of bank loan size and other firm characteristics for firms with and without
bank connections (Panel A), and with and without political connections (Panel B). The results
in Panel A show that bank loan size is significantly higher for firms with bank connections
than for those without. This result supports our hypothesis that bank connections can help
firms obtain more bank loans. We further find that firms with bank connections have a higher
leverage level, though the difference is insignificant. In Panel B, which focuses on political
connections, we observe quite similar results for our key variables and firm characteristics,
while the leverage level between firms with and without political connections is insignificant.
Table 5. Univariate tests of all variables
Panel A: Difference tests between firms with and without bank connections
With bank connections
Without bank connections
Loansize
18.55
17.25
ROA
4.45%
3.63%
Firmage
1.78
1.71
Size
21.04
21.50
Leverage
52.09%
50.15%
Tangible
40.78%
48.36%
Volatility
1.79
1.78
Employee
6.41
6.29
Indep
28.64%
24.82%
Duality
11.11%
12.42%
Bigfour
42.73%
43.65%
Repeat
81.75%
65.24%
Exeage
47.53
43.17
Tenure
2.67
2.18
Education
39.68
55.29
BankROA
1.09%
1.08%
Bankboard
2.55
2.56
Observations
126
604
Panel B: Difference test between firms with and without political connections
With political connections
Without political connections
Loansize
17.73
17.32
ROA
4.02%
3.60%
Firmage
1.87
1.62
Size
21.31
21.51
Leverage
51.76%
49.62%
Tangible
42.93%
49.85%
Volatility
1.79
1.77
Employee
6.09
6.46
Indep
24.06%
26.43%

Difference tests
1.30***(2.51)
0.82%(1.51)
0.07(0.91)
-0.46***(-4.53)
1.94%(1.13)
-7.58%***(-3.07)
0.01(1.56)
0.12(0.78)
3.82%**(2.33)
-1.31%(-0.41)
-0.92%*(-1.81)
16.51%***(4.16)
4.36***(6.87)
0.49***(2.77)
-15.61***(-3.23)
0.01%(0.17)
-0.01(-1.00)

Difference tests
0.41**(2.06)
0.42%(1.04)
0.25***(4.55)
-0.20**(-2.33)
2.14%(1.31)
-6.92%***(-3.65)
0.02**(2.47)
-0.37***(-3.31)
-2.37%*(-1.82)
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Duality
11.52%
12.64%
-1.12%(-0.45)
Bigfour
44.72%
42.23%
2.49%*(1.89)
Repeat
74.24%
63.91%
10.33%***(3.00)
Exeage
46.33
42.27
4.06***(7.70)
Tenure
2.16
2.33
-0.17*(-1.64)
Education
38.31
62.29
-23.98***(-6.54)
BankROA
1.21%
0.99%
0.22%***(3.72)
Bankboard
2.55
2.56
-0.01(-0.30)
Observations
295
435
All variables are defined in Table 2. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.

4.2 Bank connections, political connections and banks' lending decisions
In this section, we perform regression analysis to examine how bank lending behaviour
varies across firms with and without bank connections/political connections. The estimation
results of equation (1) are shown in Table 6. Columns 1 and 2 focus on bank connections and
political connections, separately, and column 3 combines them. Across three specifications,
we find that the estimated coefficients of Bank are higher than those of Political, suggesting
that bank connections have more significant effects on accessing bank loans relative to
political connections.
In Table 6, the variables we are concerned about are the interaction terms. In particular in
column 1, the coefficient on Bank*ROA is 0.77, significant at the 1% level (t-value is 2.87).
This result supports our hypothesis H1 that bank connections are able to encourage firmspecific information transfer and reduce the credit risk faced by banks, so that banks can
access more proprietary information about non-SOEs. Bank-connected executives with
financial skills can also help firms to adopt sophisticated financial decisions to facilitate more
access to external bank loans and improve firm profitability. Thus banks can lend optimally
to non-SOEs by better evaluating their profitability. In column 2, we observe that political
connections exert an opposite effect on banks' lending decisions, reflected by the negative
coefficient on Political*ROA. In column 3, which includes both bank connections and
political connections, their effects on banks' lending decisions are consistent with those in the
first two columns. Our findings are consistent with those reported by Zheng and Zhu (2013),
who argue that lending based on political connections reduces the efficiency of banks’
monitoring. The estimated coefficients on control variables are similar to those reported in
previous tables.
Overall, the results from Table 6 provide supportive evidence for our hypotheses H1 and
H2 that bank connections can enhance bank lending decisions while political connections
distort banks’ capital allocation. In general, we argue that, though both bank connections and
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political connections can facilitate access to more bank loans, they matter in different ways
and result in different economic implications. Specifically, bank-connected executives have
financial skills, and can reduce information asymmetry and potential credit risks, so that
banks are encouraged to grant loans to financially healthier firms, especially those with bank
connections that can make banks better informed. However, politically based lending is
usually granted under political pressure, which is unrelated to firm profitability and less likely
to be accompanied by bank monitoring.
Table 6. Effect of bank connections and political connections on bank lending decisions
Dependent variable
Loansize
Bank
0.40***(3.00)
0.42***(3.22)
Bank*ROA
0.77***(2.87)
0.80***(2.90)
Political
0.29**(2.01)
0.34**(2.39)
Political*ROA
-0.79**(-2.47)
-1.51***(-2.90)
ROA
1.42**(2.38)
1.04**(2.08)
1.42**(2.37)
Firmage
0.04***(2.96)
0.05***(3.76)
0.03***(2.59)
Size
0.62***(12.88)
0.62***(12.74)
0.63**(13.09)
Leverage
-0.43*(-1.78)
-0.39(-1.61)
-0.51**(-2.12)
Tangible
-0.26(-1.25)
-0.27(-1.32)
-0.20(-1.00)
Volatility
-0.19***(-5.24)
-0.20***(-5.62)
-0.18***(-5.07)
Employee
0.13***(3.60)
0.15***(4.17)
0.13***(3.56)
Indep
1.16*(1.70)
1.23*(1.80)
1.03(1.51)
Duality
-0.07(-0.47)
-0.07(-0.51)
-0.05(-0.35)
Bigfour
0.24**(1.96)
0.06(0.57)
0.33***(2.57)
Repeat
0.48***(4.73)
0.44***(4.33)
0.52***(4.97)
Exeage
0.04***(6.30)
0.05***(7.22)
0.04***(5.73)
Tenure
0.02(0.62)
0.05(1.43)
0.03(0.99)
Education
0.04(0.37)
0.02(0.16)
0.03(0.36)
BankROA
6.47(1.17)
7.99(1.44)
6.86(1.24)
Bankboard
0.01(0.02)
0.28(0.60)
0.11(0.25)
Constant
2.77*(1.77)
1.80(1.13)
2.26(1.43)
Industry fixed effects
Included
Included
Included
Year fixed effects
Included
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.40
0.38
0.39
Observations
730
730
730
This table reports the effects of bank connections and political connections on banks' lending decisions. The
dependent variable is the log of the amount of bank loans. All other variables are defined as in Table 2.
T-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

4.3 Additional evidence
4.3.1 Industrial and regional variations
As the objective of firms in building bank or political connections is to justify their
existence and overcome market failure under the poor institutional environment, the effects
of both bank and political connections depend to a large degree on the extent of the
government's industry-supporting policies and levels of market development. If bank and
political connections are effective in sheltering firms from ideological discrimination, their
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effects will be expected to diminish if firms are operating in industries that receive support
through government policy or in regions with relatively developed markets.
Firms in our sample operate in different industries and regions, and thus are subject to
different market conditions with respect to government policy and market development. On
the one hand, every five years the Chinese government announces a Five Year Plan
specifying that some specific industries will be more supported or favoured by government
policy. As our sample ranges from 2003 to 2010, which covers the tenth (2001 to 2005) and
the eleventh (2006 to 2010) Five Year Plans, we carefully identify the supported industries
during the period of each plan, and the remainder are identified as less supported industries
(See Appendix 1 for detailed classification). On the other hand, economic development varies
across provincial regions and government retains significant control over the economy in less
developed regions. In this study, we use the market development index filed by Fan et al.
(2011) to measure the level of regional development, and a higher value of the market
development index indicates a higher level of regional development. Therefore, we expect
that firms from non-supported industries or less developed regions may have more incentives
to employ connected executives in order to be favourably treated. We therefore take
advantage of this difference in industry policy and market development levels to investigate
where connections are more important to firms’ bank loan finance.
Empirically, we partition our full sample into subsamples based on whether the industry
is supported and the median value of the market development index. Then, we re-estimate the
main regression for these subsamples and report the results in Table 7. Overall, we find that
the expected coefficients of our key interaction variables still hold for the sample of firms
from less supported industries and less developed regions. These results lend support to our
main hypothesis that bank connections and political connections are effective in helping firms
to access external bank loans, but they lead to opposite patterns of capital allocation
efficiency, especially for those firms that face some discrimination in obtaining external
finance.
Table 7. Effect of connections on bank lending decisions across industries and regions
Dependent variable is Loansize
More supportive Less
supportive More developed Less developed regions
industry
industry
regions
Bank
0.20
0.47**
0.22***
0.51***
(1.10)
(1.99)
(2.92)
(2.90)
Bank*ROA
0.95
1.49***
0.55***
6.07**
(1.00)
(3.55)
(2.61)
(2.11)
Political
0.01
0.48*
0.30*
0.85***
(0.00)
(1.95)
(1.80)
(2.85)
Political*ROA
-3.38
-1.78***
-0.99
-11.57***
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(-1.07)

(-2.63)
(-0.55)
(-2.93)
4.73**a
3.72**a
b
3.55**
6.65***b
2
Adjusted R
0.43
0.45
0.41
0.46
Observations
392
338
384
346
This table reports the results of bank connections and political connections on bank loan finance in less
supported versus more supported industries and in more developed versus less developed regions. Other control
variables are also included in the regressions. Variables are defined as in previous tables.
a
and b are F-statistics values of Chow tests, revealing the significance of the difference in the coefficients on the
Bank*ROA and Political *ROA between firms from two subsamples.
T-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Chow tests

4.3.2 Channels through which both connections work4
In our main hypothesis development, we argued that bank connections are helpful in
mitigating information asymmetry, lead firms to better access external bank loans and can
improve capital allocation efficiency, while political connections can lead firms to better
access external bank loans through government intervention, which may reduce capital
allocation efficiency. If our arguments are valid, we expect to see that the effect of bank
connections is more pronounced in firms with a higher level of information asymmetry, and
the effect of political connections is more pronounced in firms located in regions with a lower
level of law enforcement. In this section, we aim to provide direct empirical evidence to
validate our arguments.
First, following Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995), we use the number of analysts
following a firm to measure the level of a firm’s information asymmetry, and a larger number
of analysts indicates a lower level of information asymmetry. Second, we use the ranking
indicator of enforcing contracts provided by the Doing Business in China 2008 (World Bank
Group) to measure the level of law enforcement. It is noted that this indicator is measured at
the capital city level of each province, and we take these values of indicators as the measure
of law enforcement at the provincial level 5 . Then, we divide our full sample into two
subsamples based on the median value of information asymmetry and the median value of
law enforcement, and re-estimate the main regressions for these subsamples.
The results reported in Table 8 confirm our previous discussions. For example, when we
compare the results from the first two columns, we find that the coefficients of Bank*ROA
are positive and significantly higher for firms with a high level of information asymmetry.

4

We thank the reviewer for suggesting this test.
We also use one composite index of the market development index by Fan et al. (2011), the legal environment
composite index, to measure the level of law enforcement. As the ranking of provinces is the same based on
either the market development index or the composite index, we obtain the same results as those reported in the
last two columns in Table 7. These results are also consistent with our expectation that the influence of political
connections is more significant in regions with a lower level of law enforcement.
5
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We also find that the effect of political connections is significantly higher for firms located in
regions with a low level of law enforcement. Overall, the evidence from both the information
asymmetry and law enforcement perspectives confirms our main hypothesis that bank
connections are able to reduce the information asymmetry between borrowing firms and
banks, which can lead to more favourable bank loan finance and more efficient capital
allocation by banks. However, political connections help firms to better access external bank
loans through government intervention, and this effect is more pronounced in regions with
low law enforcement, which can lead to lower capital allocation efficiency.
Table 8. Effect of connections on bank lending decisions across information asymmetry and law
enforcement
Dependent variable is Loansize
High
information Low
information High
law Low
law
asymmetry
asymmetry
enforcement
enforcement
Bank
0.65***(3.08)
0.24(1.42)
0.32***(2.88)
0.87***(2.91)
Bank*ROA
5.90***(2.94)
0.51*(1.77)
0.51*(1.95)
1.16***(2.95)
Political
0.58***(2.57)
0.20**(2.11)
1.05(0.58)
0.24**(2.05)
Political*ROA
-4.05(-1.43)
-1.34***(-2.61)
-0.56(-0.64)
-5.82**(-2.03)
Chow tests
4.23** a
5.23** b
2
Adjusted R
0.42
0.50
0.46
0.38
Observations
389
341
381
349
This table reports the results of bank connections and political connections on bank loan finance in firms with
high versus low information asymmetry, and high versus low law enforcement. Other control variables are also
included in the regressions. Variables are defined as in previous tables.
a
and b are F-statistics values of Chow tests, revealing the significance of the difference in the coefficients on the
Bank*ROA and Political*ROA between firms from two subsamples.
T-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

4.3.3 Firm shareholder reaction to bank loan announcements
A natural extension would be to examine the financial implications of both bank and
political connections on firm value, reflected in market reactions, and to provide
complementary evidence. If banks extend loans to firms with bank connections, this will
provide a strong signal to the market that the commitment is credible and the borrowing firms
are of better quality. Thus, shareholders will value loan contracts with these firms more
highly than those without. However, politically based lending may not be beneficial to firm
shareholders, as it is argued that political connections are a rent-seeking tool to extract private
benefits (Chen et al., 2011a), and could cause capital misallocation by banks, which will lead
to less efficient investment by firms (Zheng and Zhu, 2013). In this sense, shareholders may
put a lower value on politically based lending.
Thus, in this section we apply an event-study method to investigate the effects of bank
connections and political connections on the market value placed by investors. Specifically,
the announcement effect is measured by the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns
19

(CARs) around the bank-loan announcements using the market-adjusted excess return model.
We choose a three-day event window (i.e., -1, +1), and 230 days as the estimation window
(i.e., -240, -10).
To apply the CARs to measure the market reaction accurately, we require all shares in
our sample to have trading information available from 240 days before the bank-loan
announcements. Thus, we delete 85 observations from our original sample because of
unavailable trading information. To isolate the market reaction to bank-loan announcements,
we also delete bank-loan observations where a major event happened during our estimation
window, including split-share reform (43), chairman or CEO turnover (18) and mergers and
acquisitions announcements (6). Ultimately, we have 578 bank-loan observations for our
analysis in this section, and 578 matching CARs observations in total. Empirically, we
regress CARs around bank-loan announcements against a set of firm characteristics.
As shown in Table 9 Panel A, the coefficient on Bank is positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.28) in column 1. However, in column 2, which
considers political connections, we find that Political is significantly negatively related to
CARs. In column 3, where we combine both Bank and Political, the estimated coefficients of
both variables are quite similar to their individual estimations in the first two columns.
These results complement our previous findings. In summary, through reducing
information asymmetry, bank connections facilitate efficient capital allocation and receive
favourable market reactions. However, lending based on political connections shows a
negative effect on market reactions, which echoes the findings of Zheng and Zhu (2013),
because political connections may induce capital misallocation and inefficient investment.
Thus, our previous results, as well as the results from Table 8, confirm our main hypothesis
that bank connections differ from political connections in terms of the mechanisms through
which they affect firm value.
4.3.4 Bank shareholder reaction to bank loan announcements
The above analysis shows that firm shareholders respond positively to bank-loan
announcements concerning firms with bank connections. A natural question would be
whether this is due to a wealth transfer from banks to firms. We then examine how bank
shareholders react to these bank loan announcements. On the one hand, banks can reduce
their monitoring costs and improve their monitoring ability for lending to firms with bank
connections, so bank shareholders may feel confident about the safety of their lending and
place more value on these loans. On the other hand, political pressure forces banks to make
politically based lending, which may not necessarily be consistent with bank shareholders’
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interests. Moreover, such politically based lending may also lead to huge non-performing
loans in China (Zheng and Zhu, 2013). In this sense, bank shareholders may discount the
value of lending to firms with political connections.
We also use the event-study method in this section to examine the investor reaction to
these bank loan announcements. From the initial 730 bank loan announcements, we first
delete 99 observations because of unavailable trading information, either because lending
banks are not listed on the stock exchange, or because there is not enough trading information
for listed banks to calculate CARs. We also delete 65 observations to exclude contamination
by other major events, leaving 566 observations for empirical analysis. Empirically, we
regress the three-day CARs of bank shares around bank loan announcements against a set of
bank characteristics.
In Table 9 Panel B, which focuses on bank shareholder reactions, we observe quite
similar results to those reported in Panel A with respect to bank connections. In particular, the
estimated coefficients on Bank are both positive and statistically significant at the 5% level,
while the coefficients on Political are both negative and statistically significant at the 5%
level. These results indicate that bank shareholders respond positively when banks extend
loans to firms with bank connections, but negatively when banks extend loans to firms with
political connections. Overall, these results are consistent with our predictions that lending
decisions towards non-SOEs with bank connections are enhanced, while lending decisions
towards non-SOEs with political connections are further distorted.
Table 9. The effects of bank connections and political connections on CARs
Panel A: Dependent variable is the CARs (-1,+1) for firm shareholders around bank-loan announcements
Bank
0.005**(2.28)
0.006**(2.06)
Political
-0.022***(-6.95)
-0.020***(-6.82)
Control variables are firm-level characteristics, including return on assets, firm size, tangible assets, board size,
independent-director ratio, CEO duality, CEO age, CEO tenure, bank loan size, lending bank type and industry
fixed effects.
Adjusted R2
0.14
0.13
0.14
Observations
578
578
578
Panel B: Dependent variable is the CARs (-1,+1) for bank shareholders around bank-loan announcements
Bank
0.013**(2.04)
0.013**(2.45)
Political
-0.012**(-2.00)
-0.012**(-2.05)
Control variables are bank-level characteristics, including return on assets, bank size, board size, independentdirector ratio, bank loan size, lending bank type and industry fixed effects.
Adjusted R2
0.13
0.13
0.15
Observations
566
566
566
This table reports the results of the market reaction to bank loan announcements from the perspective of both
firm shareholders and bank shareholders. The dependent variable is the three-day CARs of both firm shares and
bank shares around bank loan announcements. Control variables are measured using the values at the end of the
year before the year of bank loan announcements.
The T-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. ** and *** indicate
the significance levels at 5% and 1%, respectively.
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4.3.5 Connections and other bank loan contract terms
In the previous analysis, we have explored whether and how bank connections and
political connections affect the bank loan size and capital allocation efficiency (measured by
the relationship between bank loan size and ROA). As there are other terms in a bank loan
contract, such as interest rate, maturity and whether the collateral is required, we aim to
provide evidence on whether and how connections affect other terms, to further our
understanding about the effect of connections on bank lending decisions. Empirically, we
replace the dependent variable in equation (1) with a dummy variable for collateral
requirement, debt maturity and interest rate, and the estimation results are reported in Table
10. As shown in the first column, we find that both connections can reduce the probability of
pledging collateral to obtain bank loans, indicating that both connections help firms to reduce
financing costs. The larger coefficient of Bank compared with that of Political also suggests
that the effect of bank connections on reducing financing costs is more significant than that of
political connections. In column 2, we find that political connections are helpful for obtaining
more short-term loans, which is consistent with the evidence provided by Liu et al. (2016),
while bank connections facilitate long-term loans, though the effect is insignificant. In
column 3, we find that neither connection has a significant effect on interest rate level. The
possible explanation is that during our sample period, the interest rate on bank loans is still
relatively regulated by the government and banks have less discretion to determine the
interest rate based on the quality of borrower. Overall, these additional results provide further
evidence supporting our main finding that bank connections have a greater impact compared
with political not only on accessing bank loans but also on debt maturity and collateral
requirement.
Table 10 The effect of connections on other bank loan contract terms
Dependent variable
Collateral
Debt maturity
Interest rate
Bank
-0.67**(-2.49)
0.19(1.09)
-0.34(-0.77)
Political
-0.43**(-2.21)
-0.64***(-3.40)
0.36(0.73)
Other control variables from equation (1) are included in all regressions
Adjusted/Pseudo R2
0.14
0.06
0.19
Observations
730
574
151
This table reports the effects of bank connections and political connections on collateral requirement, debt
maturity and interest rate. All the variables are defined as in Table 2.
T-statistics (Z-statistics) (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. ** and ***
indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

4.3.6 Other tests
If our main argument, that bank connections are able to alleviate information asymmetry
with banks and reduce banks’ monitoring costs, is valid, then we will expect that firms with
bank connections are more likely to receive loans for the first time from banks. To provide
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empirical evidence to verify our expectation, we re-estimate equation (1) by limiting the
empirical sample to those that are first loan applications. We use the following steps to
construct our empirical sample. First, from our main sample used in the previous analysis, we
drop those for repeated loans. Secondly, from the Bank Loan dataset in the CSMAR, we also
collect unsuccessful bank loan announcements (which only reflect the intention of seeking a
loan but without the eventual granting of a loan) and limit it to first-time loan applications
made by our sample of non-SOEs to a particular bank during our sample period from 2003 to
2010. Then, we combine these bank loan announcements together to form the empirical
sample. To conduct regression analysis, we create a new dependent variable for this analysis,
First, which is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is successfully granted and
0 if the loan is rejected. From the unreported results, we observe that the estimated
coefficients on Bank and Political, individually and jointly, are all positive and statistically
significant, indicating that firms with either bank connections or political connections are
more likely to receive loans for the first time from banks, and that bank connections are more
important than political connections, reflected by the magnitude and significance of estimated
coefficients. However, caution should be taken when interpreting our results because some
firms might have applied for the loans before 2003 (which is the start of our sample), and the
first loan applications we mentioned above are not actually the real first loan application.
So far, our analysis focuses on the association between a firm’s bank connections and
loans granted by all banks. We thus have an additional concern over whether the effect of
bank connections on obtaining bank loans may be more pronounced in the case of banks in
which an executive used to work. Since we have argued that bank-connected executives may
help firms reduce information asymmetry with banks, we thus conjecture that firms that are
about to negotiate loans with banks can be more direct and influential when the bankconnected executive used to work at the bank with which the loan is being negotiated. In fact,
in our sample of 126 bank loans granted to firms with bank connections, there are 70 bank
loans granted by a former employer and 56 bank loans granted by other banks. The test in this
section can also confirm the validity of our main argument. To conduct the empirical
analysis, we focus on the subsample with bank-connected firms only and create a new
variable. This variable is Lendingbank, which equals 1 if the loan is provided by the
executive’s former employer banks and 0 otherwise. We then re-estimate equation (1) by
replacing Bank dummy with this new variable. The unreported results show that the estimated
coefficient of Lendingbank is 0.04, and statistically significant at the 5% level. This result
indicates that through mitigating information asymmetry, bank-connected firms are able to
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receive more loans from the banks where the firm’s executives used to work, compared with
the loans they receive from other banks.
In our previous analysis, we consider both bank connections and political connections
together in the same regression. We also notice that during our sample, there are 29
observations with both bank connections and political connections. Thus a natural concern is
that the observed effects of both connections in the previous tables could be contaminated by
including these overlaps between bank connections and political connections. To address this
concern, we repeat all of the previous analysis by excluding these 29 observations and we
find that the results are quantitatively similar to those reported in the previous tables, which
further confirms the robustness of our main results.
4.4 Endogeneity issue
Our main analysis may face a potential concern over endogeneity due to selection bias,
since bank-connected or politically connected executives are not randomly distributed among
our sample firms. In other words, a firm may appoint a bank-connected or politically
connected executive when the firm is considering entering external capital markets.
Moreover, whether to establish bank connections or political connections may also be
determined by banks’ lending decisions. Thus, the association between the presence of bank
connections/political connections and bank lending decisions partially stems from reverse
causality. In addition, firms with either bank connections or political connections might have
other firm-specific characteristics unaccounted for in our model that affect both the
connection status and bank loan finance. In other words, firms’ bank connections and
political connections might be correlated with other unobserved variables which will
potentially bias the results. Although it is difficult to rule out the endogeneity issue
completely, we attempt to minimize endogeneity concerns in three ways.
First, we apply the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure and estimate treatment effect
regressions to correct for endogeneity, which has been used by Villalonga and Amit (2006),
Chen et al. (2011b), and Wu et al. (2012). The first stage of the procedure involves a probit
analysis where a bank (political) connection dummy is regressed against the same control
variables from the bank loan equation. To meet the exclusion restrictions, we also include
three variables that we do not include in the second-stage regression, by examining the
Chinese institutional settings. The first two variables are Industry and Region, which we used
in Table 7 to divide the full sample into subsamples. Specifically, Industry is a dummy
variable equal to 1 for firms from more supported industries and 0 otherwise, and Region is a
dummy variable equal to 1 for firms located in more developed regions and 0 otherwise. The
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third variable is the log of the amount of bank loans, which is included to test for a potential
reverse causation. We obtain the inverse mills ratio (Lambda) from the first stage and include
it as an independent variable in the second stage regression analysis of bank loan finance. We
report the results of the first stage in Panel A of Table 11, and report the variables of interest
of the second stage in Panel B of Table 11. First, from the first stage we find that firms from
less supported industries are likely to establish bank connections, while firms from less
developed regions are likely to establish political connections. Then in the second-stage
results, we observe that across three specifications, the Lambda are all significantly negative,
indicating that unobserved variable bias and the endogeneity issue might exist in the previous
analysis. After correcting for these endogeneity issues, bank connections can also enhance
banks’ lending decisions while political connections may weaken the incentive of banks to
grant loans to financially healthier firms.
Secondly, if an executive with either bank connections or political connections is
appointed to facilitate bank loan finance, the deal is likely to be announced shortly after this
executive’s appointment. Therefore, following the method applied by Huang et al. (2014), we
limit our empirical sample to observations that are less prone to endogeneity bias by
excluding observations in which a bank or politically connected executive’s tenure is less
than three years. Our results remain robust. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the
results here.

Table 11. Effect of connections on bank lending decisions (Heckman two-stage analysis)
Panel A: The first stage of Heckman
Bank connections
Political connections
ROA
3.15(1.53)
2.61(1.58)
Firmage
0.05(1.51)
0.22***(5.33)
Size
-0.64***(-4.08)
-0.28*(-1.74)
Leverage
1.96***(2.81)
2.84***(3.68)
Tangible
-1.30**(-2.22)
0.29(0.45)
Volatility
0.12(0.67)
0.66***(4.30)
Employee
0.04(0.44)
-0.55***(-4.65)
Indep
2.51(1.43)
5.58***(2.57)
Duality
-0.40(-0.97)
-0.84(-1.62)
Bigfour
4.52***(4.44)
8.03***(6.01)
Repeat
-1.09***(-3.53)
-1.12***(-3.83)
Exeage
0.09***(4.05)
0.10***(4.41)
Tenure
0.27***(2.96)
-0.31***(-3.15)
Education
0.02(0.30)
0.02(0.87)
BankROA
3.03(0.19)
5.83***(3.31)
Bankboard
-4.33***(3.10)
4.74***(3.19)
Industry
-0.56**(-2.03)
0.31(1.11)
Region
-0.08(-0.29)
-0.72**(-2.34)
Loansize
5.80***(2.84)
7.78***(2.60)
Constant
12.98***(2.63)
-19.77***(-3.86)
Pseudo R2
0.37
0.59
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Observation
730
730
Panel B: The second stage of the Heckman and the dependent variable is Loansize
Bank
0.09(1.61)
0.11*(1.78)
Bank*ROA
0.85**(1.99)
0.91**(2.07)
Political
0.11(0.76)
0.08(0.60)
Political*ROA
-0.07**(-2.04)
-0.45**(-2.28)
LambdaBank
-1.58***(-4.76)
-1.11***(-3.31)
LambdaPolitical
-2.93***(-7.29)
-2.53***(-6.21)
Control variables from the bank loan finance equation are also included in each regression.
Adjusted R2
0.41
0.42
0.46
Observations
730
730
730
Panel A and Panel B of this table reports the Heckman two-stage analysis results of bank connections and
political connections on bank loan finance after correcting for possible selection bias. LambdaBank and
LambdaPolitical are inverse mills ratios obtained from the first stages. Variables are defined as in previous tables.
T-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Thirdly, we address the endogeneity issue using the propensity score matching method,
which is consistent with Faccio et al. (2006). In the matching process, for each observation in
the treatment sample (i.e., those observations with connections), we identify an observation in
the control sample (i.e., those observations without connections) with the same/nearest
propensity score of firm characteristics including firm size, leverage, tangibility, volatility,
employment, and board independence. As we are concerned about both bank connections and
political connections, we conduct the matching process two times for each connection. This
procedure leads to 180 observations when we match on the bank connections and 356
observations when we match on the political connections. When we consider both
connections in the same regression, we merge these two matching samples and the sample
size is 476. The slight difference in the size of the merged sample is due to the fact that some
observations in the control samples are overlapped. First, to validate our matching process,
we conduct the difference tests of these firm characteristics between connected firms and
non-connected firms and report the results in Panels A and B of Table 12. We find that the
differences of these firm characteristics are not significant. Then, we report the regression
results using the matching samples in Panel C of Table 12. The estimated coefficients of the
interaction terms are significant which are consistent with our main findings. The results
suggest that after controlling for the endogeneity issue using the propensity score matching
method, bank connection enhances the positive relationship between bank loan size and
profitability and political connection weakens the positive relationship between bank loan
size and profitability.
Table 12. Effect of connections on bank lending decisions (Propensity score matching method)
Panel A: Difference tests of firm characteristics between firms with and without bank connections
Bank connections
No bank connections
Difference (t-value)
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Size
21.08
21.06
0.02(0.25)
Leverage
51.83%
52.25%
-0.42%(0.22)
Tangible
41.76%
39.58%
2.18%(0.83)
Volatility
1.72
1.79
-0.07(-0.34)
Employee
6.26
6.36
-0.10(-0.84)
Indep
29.16%
27.47%
1.69%(0.91)
Panel B: Difference tests of firm characteristics between firms with and without political connections
Political connections
No political connections
Difference (t-value)
Size
21.53
21.49
0.04(0.36)
Leverage
48.59%
49.82%
-0.23%(-0.63)
Tangible
45.87%
50.33%
-4.46%(-0.91)
Volatility
1.73
1.85
-0.12(-0.87)
Employee
6.15
6.29
-0.14(-1.39)
Indep
27.92%
25.58%
2.34%(1.47)
Panel C: Propensity score matching method regression results
Bank
0.02(0.74)
-0.01(-0.53)
Bank*ROA
0.15**(2.02)
0.09*(1.83)
Political
0.01(1.46)
0.01(0.20)
Political*ROA
-0.11***(-2.66)
-0.10***(-2.90)
Control variables from the bank loan finance equation are also included in each regression.
Adjusted R2
0.29
0.16
0.18
Observations
180
356
476
Panel A and Panel B of this table reports the difference tests of firm characteristics between connected firms and
non-connected firms. Panel C of this table reports the regression results using the propensity score matching
method. In Panel C, T-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. *,
** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

5. Ex-post performance
Previous analysis concludes that lending to firms with bank connections allocates capital
much more efficiently due to less information asymmetry and improved bank monitoring,
while politically based lending is regarded as a form of capital misallocation (Zheng and Zhu,
2013). However, no direct evidence has been presented with respect to the consequence of
individual loans. This section provides further empirical evidence regarding the ex-post
performance of each bank loan to complement our previous findings. As suggested by
Engelberg et al. (2012), the ideal test would be to compare the default rate (reflecting the
potential risk levels) between relationship-based and non-relationship-based loans. However,
the CSMAR does not provide data on whether the loan is defaulted subsequently. Thus, in the
spirit of Qian and Yeung (2014), we use the probability that a firm will subsequently be
flagged with ST or *ST, and its stock returns after the loan is granted, to approximately
measure the ex-post performance of bank loans. In this section, we create a variable, ST,
which is equal to 1 if a firm has been flagged with ST or *ST since the origination of the
bank loan and 0 otherwise. According to the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC), a listed firm will be flagged with ST if this firm has shown a negative net income
for two consecutive years. If an ST firm fails to recover, the flag will be changed to *ST as a
warning of delisting. In relation to future stock returns, we collect stock returns 12, 24 and 36
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months after the initiation of bank loans and regress on our key variable and a set of control
variables. These results are reported in Table 13.
Before proceeding, we note one important change to the sample. In the previous analysis,
the unit of observation was the individual bank loans, which occasionally included multiple
tranches within a bank (in the same year to different borrowers) or multiple tranches within a
firm (in the same year from different banks). Following previous studies using loan-level data
(Engelberg et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2012), we treated these as independent observations in
our previous analysis. However, this becomes inappropriate when examining firm-level
performance. Even if a firm borrows multiple loans from the same bank in the same year, this
clearly constitutes only one independent observation for the firm’s ex-post performance.
Collapsing at the loan level reduces the sample to 274 when using the probability of entering
financial distress and future stock returns as the dependent variables.
In column 1 of Table 13, the dependent variable is the probability of being flagged with
ST and *ST. From the estimation results, we observe that the coefficients on Bank and
Political are -1.62 and 0.86, both significant at either the 1% or 5% levels (t-values are -3.30
and 1.96, respectively). These results indicate that firms with bank connections are less likely
to become financially troubled, while firms with political connections are more likely. In
columns 2 to 4 of Table 13, the dependent variable is future stock returns, defined as the
cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock returns on the basis of monthly stock returns. As
can be seen, the estimated coefficients on Bank are all positive and statistically significant
(except for the 36-month regression), indicating that over the long-term windows returns are
predictable from a firm’s connections with the lending banks. However, this effect tends to
disappear slightly over a three-year window. The overall results are consistent with our
previous findings that loans to firms with bank connections are highly efficient and beneficial
to firm shareholders. In relation to political connections, all three columns show that returns
for politically connected firms are lower than those for non-politically connected firms. This
is consistent with our prediction that, though political connections bring more bank loans,
investors tend to discount the values of these bank loans. This is because firms are expected
to return the favour to government, such as bribing government officials or paying more tax,
in exchange for obtaining favourable bank loans, which may offset the benefits of political
connections. In addition, the subsequent expropriation would be more severe if a loan is
granted to firms with political connections.
Table 13. Bank connections, political connections and ex-post performance
Dependent variable
Probability
of
Future stock returns
becoming ST or ST*
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12-months
24-months
36-months
Bank
-1.62***(-3.30)
0.07**(3.07)
0.17**(3.97)
0.09(0.88)
Political
0.86**(1.96)
-0.08***(-3.52)
-0.08***(-2.04)
-0.10***(-1.97)
Control variables from equation (1) are also included in these regressions
Observations
274
274
274
274
Adjusted R2
0.33
0.17
0.16
0.14
This table relates firms’ probability of entering financial distress and future stock returns of the borrower to
bank connections and political connections. The control variables from our equation (1) are also included in all
regressions.
The T-statistics (Z-statistics) (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered by firm. *, **
and *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

6. Conclusion
The objective of this study is to examine the financial implications of firms’ connections
with both banks and governments for banks' lending decisions. Using bank loan level data
between 2003 and 2010, we find that the amount of bank loans is more closely related to
profitability for firms with bank connections, while bank loans granted to firms with political
connections are less influenced by firm profitability. We also find that the impact of bank
connections on bank lending decisions becomes more pronounced in less supported industries
and less developed regions. Further analysis also shows that while bank-connected executives
can use their financial skills to access more bank loans, their effect on mitigating information
asymmetry is significantly larger. This evidence supports our argument that bank connections
can alleviate severe information asymmetry and interest conflicts between firms and banks
and reduce bank monitoring costs, which may result from ideological discrimination and
market failure.
With regard to market reactions to bank-loan announcements, we find that both firm and
bank investors are optimistic about announcements of bank loans granted to firms with bank
connections, while they discount the value of bank loans granted to firms with political
connections. Furthermore, borrowers with bank connections are much less likely to become
financially distressed, and they exhibit higher future stock returns, once their bank loans are
initiated, while borrowers with political connections are significantly more likely to become
financially distressed, and they exhibit lower future stock returns. Additional analysis further
suggests that the effect of bank connections becomes more profound when firms borrow from
banks where firm executives used to work.
Overall, we argue that in an emerging market, where the financial and legal system is
underdeveloped and legal protection for creditors and investors is weak, bank connections
can be a substitute for legal protection, and effectively alleviate information asymmetry and
improve capital allocation efficiency. However, political connections are exploited through
exerting political pressure, which may not reduce the credit risk and could lead to capital
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misallocation. Our evidence helps to explain the coexistence of a weak institutional
framework and vibrant private-sector growth in China.

Appendix 1. Identification of supported industries
Panel A: The tenth Five-Year Plan
The following industries are included in the tenth Five-Year Plan as supported industries: A01 Agriculture,
A03 Forestry, A05 Livestock farming, A07 Fishery, A09 Agriculture, Forestry, Livestock farming, Fishery, B
Mining, C43 Chemical material and products manufacturing, C47 Chemical fibre production, C48 Rubber
production, C49 Plastic production, C51 Electric-parts manufacturing, C67 Ferrous-metal foundries and
presses, C69 Metal production, C73 Special-equipment manufacturing, C75 Transportation-equipment
manufacturing, C76 Electric-equipment manufacturing, C81 Medicine manufacturing, C85 Biological products,
D01 Electricity, steam and hot-water production and supply, D03 Gas production and supply, E01 Civilengineering building, F01 Railway transportation, F03 Highway transportation, F05 Pipeline transportation,
F07 Waterway transportation, F09 Air transportation, G81 Telecommunication and equipment manufacturing,
G85 Telecommunication service, G87 Computer application and service, J01 Real estate management, H11
Retail.
Panel B: The eleventh Five Year Plan
The following industries are included in the eleventh Five-Year Plan as supported industries: A01 Agriculture,
A03 Forestry, A05 Livestock farming, A07 Fishery, A09 Agriculture, Forestry, Livestock farming, Fishery,
C01 Food processing, C43 Chemical material and products manufacturing, C51 Electric-parts manufacturing,
C67 Ferrous-metal foundries and presses, C73 Special-equipment manufacturing, C75 Transportationequipment manufacturing, C76 Electric-equipment manufacturing, C81 Medicine manufacturing, C85
Biological products, D01 Electric power, steam and hot-water production and supply, D03 Gas production and
supply, F01 Railway transportation, F03 Highway transportation, F05 Pipeline transportation, F07 Waterway
transportation, F09 Air transportation, F11 Transportation auxiliary, G81 Telecommunication and equipment
manufacturing, G85 Telecommunication service, G87 Computer application and service, J01 Real estate
management, K01 Public service, K34 Tourism.
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